MOL comes clean on how this year’s most high profile shipping accident occurred
Japanese shipping major Mitsui OSK Lines (MOL) today came clean on what most in the industry already knew – the reason for this year’s most high profile shipping casualty. Japan’s largest shipping line also warned in the unveiling of new safety measures that from now on it would become far more involved in the selection of all senior crew on ships it charters.
MOL was the charterer of the Wakashio newcastlemax, a 300 m long giant of the seas, owned by Nagashiki Shipping and crew managed by Anglo-Eastern. En route to Brazil from Asia, the ship diverted from its course, running aground on pristine coral reefs just off southern Mauritius on July 25. The bulk carrier would go on to spill around 1,000 tonnes of bunker fuel, creating the worst ecological disaster the Indian Ocean republic had experienced. The Wakashio then split in two with the front three quarters towed 30 km from the coastline for scuttling and salvage operations to remove the stern ongoing.
newcastlemax, a 300 m long giant of the seas, owned by Nagashiki Shipping and crew managed by Anglo-Eastern. En route to Brazil from Asia, the ship diverted from its course, In announcing measures to prevent another reoccurrence of a Wakashio style disaster today, MOL gave the reason the ship had changed its passage plan from leaving a 22 nautical mile gap between it and the island of Mauritius to just two nautical miles. The reason cited, according to a release, was “to enter an area within the communication range of mobile phones”. Moreover, MOL revealed the crew were using a nautical chart without sufficient scale to confirm the accurate distance from the coast and water depth. In addition, MOL said a crewmember neglected appropriate watch-keeping, both visually and by radar.
MOL’s detailing of how the accident happened dovetails with what accident investigators for the ship’s flag, Panama, have revealed thus far.
In September Panamanian authorities gave an update into their ongoing Wakashio accident investigation, having interviewed most of the crew.
The registry has been able to ascertain that the Wakashio’s crew, in the afternoon of July 25, celebrated the birthday of one of the crewmembers.
Furthermore, the ship deviated from its approved navigation plan. The crew have told investigators that ship came closer to the Mauritian coastline as the captain – now in jail with the first officer – sought a telephone and internet signal in order for the crew to communicate with their families.
“With an appropriate assessment safeguard and with good seamanship practices, that should have generated an analysis which would have allowed to carry out the pertinent actions to correct this situation,” the Panama Maritime Authority noted in an update.
Like MOL, the Panamanian investigators believe the ship did not have the right chart onboard. Moreover, the wrong chart was used and with the wrong scale as well.
“The lack of supervision and monitoring of the navigation equipment, the distraction generated by the officer of watch, who lost the course of navigation completely, and the excess of confidence during the watch, could be some of the reasons that caused the ship running aground in the beaches of Mauritius,” the Panama Maritime Authority stated.
The Panama Maritime Authority had earlier suggested the ship ran into difficulty because of bad weather, although data providers at the time showed there was no inclement weather around southern Mauritius when the bulk carrier entered local waters.
MOL, which has already spent considerable sums helping in the clean up and rehabilitation of communities affected by the spill, said today it had earmarked a further Y500m ($4.82m) in measures to prevent another accident like the Wakashio.
Cases of ships heading near shorelines to access wifi are common, especially this year when crew have been stuck at sea for many more months than their contracts stipulate thanks to Covid-19 travel restrictions. As 2020 ends, there are still far too few ships equipped with free wifi for all aboard.
Writing his annual review in his inimitable, wry style yesterday, Splash lead columnist Andrew Craig-Bennett noted: “Another thing that nobody talks about is the near universal practice of ships taking every opportunity to pass within cellphone range of any coast that has a mobile phone system, i.e. anywhere. Wonder why people do that?”
While the Wakashio was this year’s most high profile casualty there were plenty of other ship write-offs making headlines such as the Stellar Banner VLOC, which grounded off Brazil in February and was eventually scuttled in June. The most deadly shipping casualty of the year was the Gulf Livestock 1, a converted livestock carrier that went down off southern Japan in a typhoon in September with the loss of 41 lives and more than 5,800 cattle.
Any official mention of people on over-extended contracts due to pandemic response?
“In our dreams”, Scotty! But you and I and everyone reading this can put two and two together.
This spectacular casualty is the tip of a pyramid of many hundreds of smaller accidents and many thousands of “near misses”.
Let’s look a little closer and ask ourselves “Why was this big ship closing the coast of Mauritius on a small scale chart?”
It would have been simple to download the dongle for the large scale chart.
Might one suggest that the right chart was not purchased because the superintendent in Hong Kong would have spotted the item and issued a “we fail to understand” email?
EXACTLY SIR.
Will MOL (as a main shareholder in ONE) be so forthcoming about the ONE Apus, when they have gathered the facts?
I do not believe this “small scale chart” explanation.
Not one bit.
It is actually a very reasonable explanation. Smaller scale charts will offer you less information, for the same area as compared to a large scale chart.
The passage plan may not have required the large scale chart to begin with, depending on the planned distance from the shoreline. But once the vessel diverted to get closer to land, there was inherent danger. The OOW and master simply had no clue as the proper depths at which they were navigating.
On Ecdis you can zoom a chart till it goes into OVERSCALE. Overscale is indicated by vertical stripes. That is the time you know that all features might not be displayed. Time to stop fxxxing around and get into deeper waters.
spot on
MOL managers have not real qualities. False enrichment has led them to lose all manual skills, (which are the basis of any economic progress at shipping sector). The $4.82m only creates expectations that will change nothing!
“ … the distraction generated by the officer of watch, who lost the course of navigation completely … “
In other words, there was nobody standing on the bridge looking out the window. For a few hours at least from what I can see.
Nor were ANY crew ANYwhere on the ship looking forward as the ship plodded along at 10 or 12 knots. It’s a bulker with no cargo blocking the view out the window of the house looking forward from ANY cabin of the ship.
The ship hit the island at right angles, we all saw the photos. The island is NOT a flat reef. It is mountainous enough to have been seen visually from many miles away.
This disaster is stunning in its incredulous stupidity from every possible perspective. The fault is with every person aboard that considered themselves a “seafarer” in any possible way.
Agreed Ed. But l think the chart is something of a red herring. Nobody navigates solely and primarily on a chart when the land is visible both by radar and eyesight. The chart gets us to the general area, but radar and eyesight take over as soon as possible to accurately fix the ship’s position. (I rate GPS alongside the chart. I suspect the only nav-aid used on most ships these days is the GPS. Nobody takes sights anymore-deskilling allows for cheaper crews). This is especially true when making a landfall. So it all leads back to the Master, and his approach to his command of the ship. Usually everyone else falls in line behind him. It wasn’t irrelevant that the OOW wasn’t on the bridge either. Or that the Master acceded to or perhaps even initiated the close pass of Mauritius when the plotted course didn’t allow for it. Now he must live with his bad decisions, as must the people and coastline of a formerly pristine island.
Apart from all the negligence and disregard of seamanship, How about all crew overdue for relief due to covid. Officers were on board for more than 1 year.
Capt. Sir
May be You are right, but may be You have read 10-12 articles written in FORBES magazine by highly skilled, eloquent, well educated hired gun to cover up the real issues and offer distraction from other things . I was amazed by his research team skills ,speed and effectiveness.
But many of his arguments/manipulations can be easily DEBUNKED. Regret to observe , that the team of apologist is active again. Surprisingly can not find any comments from IFSMA or Nautical Institutes . Wonder why????
An easily avoidable, self inflicted incident same as Costa C. Its a bit conservative to say it does not reflect well on the industry. Ownership, accountability and responsibility of the master and ship’s officers have failed, what must the ratings think of the officers in whose hands their life’s are in?
At least the Master of Costa Concordia had enjoyed a session of torrid sex with his Moldovian dancer mistress just before the accident, a fact completely excluded from the official investigation report.
Is that important ? If one thinks about prudence and due diligence, yes.
Can MOL reveal the ship’s track from about 6 hrs prior to the grounding?
Who all were on the bridge when the vl ran aground?
Was OOW under the influence of liquor?
Did the Master approve this deviation?
How did the crew get hold of Mauritiun SIM cards?
Yet PSC inspectors and surprisingly insurers do not penalise companies for having personnel on board well over their contracted period or for not having Wi-Fi on board
PSC only inspects for SOLAS Convention violations. Remember the role of a PSC state is ultimately to protect it’s own seas and coastline from pollution and grounded ships. Some will inspect for ILO Convention violations, but they are few and far between.
Not really.
PSC inspects vl for SOLAS, MARPOL, STCW 95, MLC 2006, ISPS and the ISM Code.
You may like to visit AMSA website for detention of ships for non-compliance under the above as well as other IMO conventions.
exactly
Shipowners are not obliged under MLC 2006 to provide Wi-Fi on board.
Just saying.
Having said that, an OOW cannot deviate from the passage plan for personal reasons such as looking for a telephone signal or Wi-Fi.
As they say, Suck it up, man.
exactly. Part A does not require wi-fi ,part be recommends it. simple as that
MLC 2006
Guideline B 3.1.11
4. Consideration should also be given to including the following facilities at no cost to the seafarer, where practicable:
(j) reasonable access to ship-to-shore telephone communications, and email and Internet facilities, where available, with any charges for the use of these services being reasonable in amount.
my ” part be ” should be ” part B ” – sorry- typo error. And part B is not obligatory when part A is. Trust it clarifies.
“warned … that from now on it would become far more involved in the selection of all senior crew on ships it charters”. Very interesting, indeed courageous for a charterer to “select” crew as opposed to requiring minimum crewing standards from the owner. It could have far reaching consequences.
This is pretty much in line with my initial assessment of this casualty. Some things are obvious. The ship ran aground on an exposed reef in broad daylight. Ergo nobody was facing forwards on the bridge and looking out ahead. The ship was making a landfall. Ergo the Master was not on the bridge either. I doubt anyone read the Admiralty sailing directions. The ship should have on board the appropriate large scale chart of Mauritius..Ensuring it is ordered is again the Master’s overall responsibility. Being ultimately responsible is what the four gold stripes and film-star wages are all about. The entire operation lacked professionalism at the top, both on and off the ship. Of course it is a hardship to be kept on board way past your relief date. But that can’t be allowed to interfere with the safe operation of the ship. We are adults. We don’t just give up and switch off. The same level of professionalism must be maintained throughout voyage. The most important thing a Master does is keep his ship safe. He should know where it is at every moment. He must ensure the bridge is properly and continuously manned. It is obvious here thst he did no such thing, and he must answer for it.
There were some reports that the ship was on a North Easterly heading when she ran aground.
Such tidbits will continue to muddy the waters unless MOL comes up with a credible preliminary media release.
SPOT ON SIR.
” Might one suggest that the right chart was not purchased because the superintendent in Hong Kong would have spotted the item and issued a “we fail to understand” email?”
May be the master was simply afraid or reluctant to confront the superintendent or anticipated such an email due to previous bad experiences with such superintendents. Think- “power distance”
“the captain – now in jail with the first officer” makes it sound like the men have been formally charged and convicted in court. They haven’t. Both men are being held in custody on an unconstitutional ‘provisional charge’ – basically an indefinite holding mechanism while police fish for evidence – under a section of the Piracy & Maritime Violence Act that’s designed to deal with deliberate attacks by terrorists or pirates on ships, navigational facilities or maritime infrastructure. It’s inappropriate for an accidental grounding, even if caused (allegedly) by gross incompetence or negligence. And because the facts won’t fit the charge, the fishing expedition continues. Some in Mauritius suspect that the government – deeply mired in corruption scandals – has good reason to avoid the case ever coming to court, fearing the inevitable revelations about its own negligence.
Indeed, the actions of Wakashio’s Master and crew are only part of the story. Three of the country’s coastal radar surveillance stations were out of order due to arrears of maintenance and another was unmanned. One of the two NCG officers meant to have been on duty at the Pointe-du-Diable Surveillance Station was allegedly absent and the other, after supposedly trying but failing to make contact with the ship, took no further action but just watched Wakashio, with 20 lives aboard, crash into the reef. Yet no one from the NCG has been arrested, nor has the NCG Commander issued any statement or explanation for his officers’ conduct that evening. Had it been a cruise ship, imany lives might have been lost. The country has no SAR capability worthy of the name. Its sole night-capable helicopter was down for maintenance at the time and, as we were later to discover after the loss of Sir Gaetan, the MPA’s tugs and their crews were not open-seas-capable, again due to maintenance defects and also lack of training.
The spill, which turned a wholly avoidable accident into an environmental disaster, occurred long after the Master and crew had left the ship and Wakashio was in the (capable?) hands of the salvor, SMIT, which continued to insist that the ship was stable when it was visibly settling down by the stern. Meanwhile, the Mauritian authorities, despite having an oil spill response plan and materials in store, failed to deploy them. So 13 days later, the inevitable happened.
Mauritius is astute at playing the victim card when it suits (and you can be sure that the political elite have found in the Wakashio disaster an opportunity for political and financial advantage), but it is not an impoverished little island; in fact it’s classified as a high-income country. However, maritime training, safety and security are a long way down the budgetary priority list compared with sports stadia and glitzy commercial centres.
I have to agree with Capt Colin Smith re the chart. On that course they didn’t need a chart of any scale to tell them that they were getting too close to land. The reef is a great white streak that can be spotted from miles away, there’s the distinctive silhouette of Lion Mountain, and if all else fails there’s the old lighthouse on Ile aux Fouquets. In that location (which I know well) the wrong chart is no excuse for a frankly suicidally inclined course.
Pikeman asks about the track 6 hours before the accident on 25 July. Wakashio didn’t deviate at all from the course set at 02.00 on 21 July except right in the last few minutes when it suddenly swung round by about 90deg putting Wakashio’s bow directly on to the reef – whether by accident or design we haven’t been told. Had it remained there the final outcome would have been much happier, but in the absence of action to secure it in place the ship was allowed to swing round so that after 48 hours the stern had settled on the reef and any chance of simply towing it off was lost.
Pikeman also asks about approval for the deviation. Yes, the Master approved it; he was known for this practice and reportedly had a good reputation as someone who cared about his crew. MOL told me they knew nothing about any plan to deviate. I understand there is some dispute between Nagashiki and MOL – especially as the latter seems to have been kept in the dark about the investigations in Mauritius.
The preliminary report from Panama should be taken with more than a pinch of salt. It was issued before AMP had access to crew interview transcripts, Mauritian investigators’ reports or VDR evidence and AMP provides no corroborating evidence for statements such as “the distraction generated by the officer of watch, who lost the course of navigation completely, and the excess of confidence during the watch”. AMP may itself have displayed an ‘excess of confidence’ in some of its statements!
Stephen Spark
Great comment.
A very comprehensive and thorough reply. But first l have to point out that the government of Mauritius had nothing to do with the grounding. The condition of it’s equipment is irrelevant. The ship went aground through forces internal to that ship alone. I don’t know any Master who would expect the government to ward off his ship rather than do it himself. The mis-treatment of the Master and C/O after the event is, if true, appalling, and must be stopped, but again it does nothing to our understanding of the incident. The same for the rhetoric about Mauritius in general. None of it tells us anything about the casualty. As far as the spill is concerned, whether it could have been prevented or not is a matter of fact that a thorough and open investigation should reveal. Salvors are as prone to negligence as anyone else. But what is your proof? Apropos the deviation, l like to think that l too had a good reputation amongst my crews as someone who cared for their welfare, but l would never indulge them to the point of putting my ship into danger. A competent and humane Master knows where to draw the line. Apropos the Panamanian report, l believe it has little credibility and should be ignored. They are only after tonnage money and defending the register. Since there was obviously nothing mechanically wrong with the ship, l’m afraid we must accept the obvious conclusion that she went aground because the Master and OOW put her there, regardless of their tiredness due to being beyond their relief date. This is what the final investigation by any competent body will tell us. There is no other explanation.
Capt Colin Smith
Very well put.
There is a hesitation amongst Masters to assert their authority within their ship for fear of being labelled as bullies.
Ultimately, nothing justifies a Master to allow an OOW to drive his vessel like a motorcycle on the roads of Manila.
exactly
Volt
Nautical institute is busy running a campaign on MENTORING.
It is indeed surprising how little interest most maritime magazines ( except Splash) have in pursuing issues that are directly relevant to safety.
It is actually quite hard to run a vessel aground. You must be either drunk or asleep in order to ignore the GPS, the echosounder, the ECDIS safety contour and safety depth alarms, offcouse alarms, XTE setting alarm etc.
Agreed Pikeman. But you’d think by the frequency with which it happens that it was easy. I’m going to stick my neck out here and allege that there is an absence of professionalism in the operation of these ships. What is missing is a seamanlike attitude to the entire conduct of the ship. That only comes from a seafaring culture operating large fleets of ships for centuries, with hard and fast rules like never leaving the bridge unattended. In my day such a thing was unthinkable, even in mid-ocean. Nowadays it is too common. I think it’s because most seamen today really don’t want to be there. The occupation is chosen for it’s pecuniary advantage, not as a profession in itself. My own view and experience is that a married man with children should not stay at sea. It is too hard on the family and the seaman. Companies who wish to retain their crews will take measures to mitigate the pain of separation, by shortening tours, allowing families on board, etc. Somehow the profession of seafarer has to be made attractive, respected and admired ashore.
MOL has apparently hired some new media consultants. However, the press release below hides more than it reveals.
Was the vl sailing on ECDIS or paper charts? MOL won’t say, although we know that the window for paper charts has closed.
It really doesn’t matter whether they were sailing on ECDIS, the paper charts or GPS. The Master allowed the ship to go aground. He didn’t choose the wrong chart. He didn’t choose any chart at all if he effectively let the ship run aground. The right chart makes no difference at all. Once he was within visual and radar range he should have seen where he was, how close he was going to ‘pass’ off the reef. You don’t navigate a ship by GPS if you have a superior means of position-fixing available. Forget the chart. Even if he didn’t have one he should have detected the reef by radar and visually, seen he was going to run aground, and taken the appropriate measures to avoid it. The chart is irrelevant. Forget about it. It is a red-herring. If you review the measures proposed by MOL, you will see that the bulk of them address crew quality, proficiency, training, safety awareness, etc, and the quality of the crewing agency. I suspects a big shakeup where crewing is concerned. They obviously went cheap, to increase their shareholders dividend, and it has come back to bite them. Shipowners should know that CHEAPEST isn’t BEST, that you have to pay a premium for a top-quality crew. Were it not for the insurance market constantly bailing them out, shipowners would have opted out of the Dutch auction for seafarers a long time ago.. MOL has come a long way since l was on charter to them in the 70s, from top-to-bottom Japanese flag, crew, management, etc. They had a great reputation for the highest professional standards. Were respected by everyone. Today???
Point taken. Then why has MOL tried to wriggle out of the truth by referring to the chart scale?
The Master was hired through Anglo-Eastern Ship Management, which is a top of the line manning agency. Not cheap.
It does make a difference if the vl is on ECDIS.
ECDIS is more than just paper charts. It switches over to large-scale seamlessly, provided the large scale chart is loaded. It also provides the OOW with important alarms, provided the OOW is listening. These alarms cannot be muted. They are sufficiently loud and irritating for a purpose. The safety contour and safety depth settings are very important as an anti-grounding tool, which trigger the alarms.
MOL has avoided specifying if the vl was on ECDIS or papercharts. In my opinion, is not a naive omission but a calculated trick to keep things rather vague. That’s why their claim of openness is difficult to accept.
Glad to read commentator, who knows the ECDIS ropes- why is this voice of reason coming so late?? What about ECDIS internal log/recorder – has this item disappeared too in mysterious circumstances or has been intentionally tampered with for cover up purposes??????
Now lets build a voyage plan for Wakashio for the route from Spore to Cape and see what happens, when we run ” route check” tab or other, depending on ECDIS type. Then it is a walk in the park to figure if Wakashio needed larger scale EC or not for the intended voyage. Case for students at nautical colleges or trainees in ECDIS simulation centres.
Standing and night orders contain clear message for ocean passage – while passing ships minimum 2 Nm distance , for everything else – a very wide margin minimum 10 miles from the closest danger to navigation which is not always shore line with mobile signal tower – can be something else.
Wonder if they checked BA Sailing Directions NP 039 . List of lights, Ocean passages of the world . Anything!!!!!!!!!! . It is hard to hit this island with D.R. and magnetic compass only if one knows , what one is doing. One must be a complete idiot or do it intentionally . This a binary case -you are either ZERO or ONE. No shades of grey allowed.
exactly so.
Absolutely vague investigation. Lacking key aspects how to tackle and avoid such incidents in future. Monitoring the crew is very much against the common sense. Better to monitor the ships performance instead crew dynamic.
This accident was a result of human error. There was nothing wrong with the ship. Generally if an accident can be traced to the ship rather than the crew the company will say so immediately, for obvious reasons. Everyone knows about machinery breaking down, but human error is less understandable. In this case it was the Master’s duty to keep his ship safe. It is warming to see so many seafarers leaping to the defence of the Master and OOW, but it is misplaced. Would you sleep at night knowing an incompetent Master is on board directing the passage of your ship? Re the investigation….it has barely started and will take at least a year. The Company’s “investigation” is not impartial. But it is revealing in what it gives away. Read between the lines and you will see MOL is confessing to a lot.
Definitely human error.
But does MOL afraid to say the truth and we need to read between the lines?
Decided measures such as checking ship’s track via ais analysis , random vdr navigational audits are outdated.
For the company of such size it’s uncommon to complete the investigation after 1 year. They need to show more dynamic decision. Who knows when MOL next ship will crush somewhere. The way the things are shown raising more questions than answers.
The investigation will be conducted by the Government of Mauritius, not MOL, who obviously have a dog in the fight. Being a very small country it may enlist the help of the French or British MAIBs. The Master and C/0 have fired their first lawyer and are apparently being represented by the company’s lawyer, which is a bad thing, since they have conflicting interests.
exactly
The official accident investigation will be conducted by the Flag State Panama. There may be parallel investigations by the coastal state Mauritius, for the purpose of criminal prosecution.
Definitely not human error.
If the Master has deviated from the passage plan without sufficient risk assessment and without adequate control measures, it is not human error.
Following your chain of thought , then, if it was not human error, then it was master incompetence . If so , then we have ISM 6. Resources and Personnel item 6.1.1. The Company should ensure that the Master is:
1. properly qualified for command;
Hence we have serious non-conformity with normative reference such as ISM. + missing R.A. or inadequate R.A.Then some may consider to rise the question , if said vessel was seaworthy or not.
Or following your voyage plan clue- see pls CMA CGM Libra – the voyage plan was incomplete or wrong or inadequate , what gave rise to the same question and the vessel was declared as not- seaworthy by the judge, although the case is flying to Supreme court.
I have pdf opinion of Aussie captain and a lawyer , who claims the error in this judgement quoting several previous cases and claiming that the vessel was truly not seaworthy but not due to poor voyage plan but due to master incompetence. Personally I find this captain opinion more convincing.
If the vl did not have a large scale chart, then the Master has no business to pass close to the reef.
How close or how far? That’s what Masters are paid for, to employ prudence and judgement for the safety of the ship.
If MOL is charterer… Why do they should investigate anything?
That was my question too, On their page it is clearly stated they are time charterer , not voyage charterer, not demise charterer . Have read many different time CPs and it says as follows in example:
Clause 26 (Navigation)
Nothing herein stated is to be construed as a demise of the Vessel to the Charterers. The Owners shall remain responsible for the navigation of the Vessel, acts of pilots and tug boats, insurance, crew, and all other matters, same as when trading for their own account.
and therefore it beats me too.
“Human Error” is a very broad category, and includes both negligence and incompetence. The thrust is that it emanated from a human beings actions or inaction, rather from some other cause, like the weather, mechanical breakdown, etc.
What about this? “When inquiring about the circumstances that led to the grounding of the vessel, the captain revealed that he did not have to stay on the bridge, as he had duty officers that changed shifts every 4 hours. The captain had put the responsibility of the boat onto the second in command, a certain Tilkartna, according to the detailed interview transcript published in the L’Express newspaper.”
Perhaps he doesn’t have to stay on the bridge(during an ocean passage), but surely he must be on the bridge for a landfall like this one. Command is not something you can shrug off and pass to a watch officer. It is yours from the moment you step on board until you go on leave.
“Mr Mohamed did not think any more about this phone call as he had already made the point that there were two watch duty officers on the bridge, under the supervision of the second in command, and that the captain was on a break.”
Mr Mohamed was their lawyer, but was rightly fired. 2 watch officers plus the C/O surprising means all 3 deck officers were on the bridge for one watch. Who stood the other two? And since when are Masters “on a break”!?
You wouldn’t believe the other howlers l found in the Forbes article.
Human Error is when Grandpa squeezes shaving cream on to his toothbrush.
Ha Ha Ha – and that is my man talking .I told You we are a team once 😉 😉
“Surprising” above should be “supervising”. Damned auto-correct, not human error.
https://www.mol.co.jp/en/pr/2020/20090.html
the most important is the NOTE ,(Note 1) 1 nautical mile = 1.852 kilometers. that s sufficient ground to figure out whom this statement is addressed to .
Further interesting definitions for what seems general public in update no.2 : “Shipowner” is the Owner of the ship, “Technical Manager” will provide the ship with crew, and make it ready to carry cargo. The ship is then provided to the “Operator/Charterer” (MOL) . Charterer will rent the ship for a certain period of time, find the cargo to load onboard, and give orders to the ship to transport the cargo from one location to another.
07.August 2020 : Tokyo-Mitsui O.S.K. Lines, Ltd. (MOL; President: Junichiro Ikeda) received following statement from Nagashiki Shipping Co. Ltd.(Nagashiki) who is the owners and managers of bulk carrier Wakashio and Time Chartered to MOL. (time chartered)
The latest update now mentions subsidiaries : formulated measures to prevent a reoccurrence of the incident involving the bulk carrier Wakashio, chartered by MOL from a subsidiary of Nagashiki Shipping Co., Ltd. (the Shipowner) . ( chartered from subsidiary presumably time chartered) I can not wait for the next version of MOL- Nagashiki relationship
Quote
“With an appropriate assessment safeguard and with good seamanship practices, that should have generated an analysis which would have allowed to carry out the pertinent actions to correct this situation,” the Panama Maritime Authority noted in an update.
Unquote
Can anyone decode this?
this apex of vagueness can only be achieved by Grand Master of the Holy Order of gobbledygook worshipers/users.
A colleague of mine did decode this.
“If you could see the damn breakers at 1600 LT, which was not all that difficult, provided you were looking, you should have ordered the wheel hard a stbd and get the hell into safer depths”
I have deleted the salty bits of his analytical outburst.
I am not sure abt stbd but it is not that important . To get the hell out or away from the breakers, ( even if one has to lift off into space) was the goal, on condition one knows how the breakers look like . May be all were busy in mass orgy of watching wives in bikini or without and that made them blind with You know what….. with added doses of social lubricant I am sure they reached a state of group NIRVANA .