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Japan Transport Safety Board issues report on Wakashio disaster 

The Japan Transport Safety Board has issued its report on the grounding of the Wakashio newcastlemax, one of this decade’s most high-profile bulker casualties. 

As with earlier reports into the disaster which caused huge ecological damage to Mauritius, the decision by the crew to head near to shore to seek out a telephone signal was cited as the primary cause for the accident. 

According to the report, the captain of the giant vessel ordered it to divert from its planned route and approach the coast without obtaining marine charts of the area, leading to the grounding of the ship on the evening of July 25, 2020, and subsequent breaking up on reefs with around 1,000 tons of bunker fuel then spreading out into the area.

The investigation also found the bulk carrier – on charter to Mitsui OSK Lines (MOL) – had repeatedly approached close to coastlines to connect to mobile phone networks in the past as well.

The captain also had two glasses of whisky and water at the birthday party of a crewmember before the accident.

The report from the Japan Transport Safety Board also hit out at how long it took local authorities to send out a tug to assist and potentially stave off the environmental disaster that unfolded in the coming weeks. It was only five days after the grounding that a first tug was dispatched to head to the Panamanian-flagged ship. 

Panama’s final accident report into the grounding of the Wakashio newcastlemax bulk carrier was made public in July this year. It also found that the crew’s decision to try and seek a wifi signal near to shore was the primary cause of the accident. 

It took 18 months to remove the remnants of the giant Wakashio, which split in two on reefs near a protected UNESCO World Heritage site. 

In announcing measures to prevent another reoccurrence of a Wakashio-style disaster, MOL gave the reason the ship had changed its passage plan from leaving a 22-nautical mile gap between it and the island of Mauritius to just two nautical miles. The reason cited, according to a release issued in December 2020, was “to enter an area within the communication range of mobile phones”. Moreover, MOL revealed the crew were using a nautical chart without sufficient scale to confirm the accurate distance from the coast and water depth. In addition, MOL said a crewmember neglected appropriate watch-keeping, both visually and by radar.

Investigations into the Wakashio have tended to focus on the crew. However, the failings of the coastal state, Mauritius, have received less coverage. 

According to Stephen Spark, a UK-based maritime journalist, Splash reader, and keen follower of Mauritian affairs, the country’s coastal surveillance radar was badly maintained and some units were out of action; the coastguard post at Pointe du Diable, near the grounding, was undermanned and the officer on duty wasn’t able to use the radar and radio equipment competently. As a result, according to Spark, the ship was not alerted to the danger it was in.

Sam Chambers

Starting out with the Informa Group in 2000 in Hong Kong, Sam Chambers became editor of Maritime Asia magazine as well as East Asia Editor for the world’s oldest newspaper, Lloyd’s List. In 2005 he pursued a freelance career and wrote for a variety of titles including taking on the role of Asia Editor at Seatrade magazine and China correspondent for Supply Chain Asia. His work has also appeared in The Economist, The New York Times, The Sunday Times and The International Herald Tribune.

Comments

  1. My contact in the Mauritian Coast Guard told me that a salvage crew was appointed within 24 hours of grounding.
    A ship that size must be handled by specialized salvage.
    Accordingly it is against the law in Mauritius to tamper or interfere with the property of a third party without his consent. This was not offered by the Dutch Salvage company.
    In fact when I interviewed their reoresentative asking why they took so long to intervene ge said “it was just one of those things”

    1. The full details of the initial engagement of local vessels and equipment for oil spill control and SMIT’s engagement for what was a wreck removal contract and not a salvage contract are no doubt contained in the report on the findings of the Mauritius Special Court of Enquiry. Regrettably, the Mauritius Govt. has declined to release this report to the public and no reasons appear to have been provided. As for the reported five days to dispatch a tug to site, the shipowners and their H&M and P&I may have prevaricated pending clear evidence that the vessel was or was not a constructive total loss (CTL) and which insurer (i.e. H&M or P&I) would be paying the tug’s costs. Time was then also required for a salvage/wreck removal capable tug’s mobilisation to a very remote location. No prizes in terms of response time but, by reference to my long experience as a P&I correspondent, not unusual either.

      1. Dear Robert,
        I have responded to you privately, but when the vessel struck it was indeed a wreck removal. However subsequent revelations indicated that no remove would have been possible owing to the size of the ship. These giants should be confined to open ocean and prohibited from approaching land masses. I could find no special maritime conditions governing the safe passage of these giants. The the entire Mascarene plateau is out of bounds to shipping, yet we frequently see giant cargo ships passing too close to the more distant island, well within our FAD devices. The EU is at fault here, as under the Europeche agreement they should be monitoring the behaviour of shipping. If I, a diver, using Fleetmon to track shipping, can tell when vessels are too close to our diving sites, they should be able to monitor them.

  2. I’m a former ships Master and have done this “signal hunting” before more than 10 years ago when I was sailing, but with due regard for safe navigation at all times. It’s all down to the ship owner providing basic rights of communication enablement. Yes, the buck always stops with the Master, but the clown who was on the bridge at the time of the grounding should not be allowed up the gangway of any ship in the future. Sadly he’s probably at at sea again already.

    1. There is lot of concern about the plight of sea farers. The Wakashio accident occurred during the time of COVID, when many seafarers were confined to their vessels for months on end and desperate to communication with their homes.
      Perhaps that too should be considered.

    2. Agree. Here is the next question, What’s the Director General of Indian Shipping doing about cancelling the Master’s COC ?

  3. I have received an intimation from someone close to the action in Mauritius that the Opposition alliance (PTr, MMM, PMSD) has pledged to release the Court of Investigation report should it win the next general election. Unlike the current MSM government – increasingly criticised for orchestrating the country’s slide towards autocracy – the Alliance would have no reason to keep the report under wraps and probably every reason to release it, if only to embarrass Pravind Jugnauth (current PM). The PTr leader has a mixed record too, but if this political infighting gets the report published and the truth – some of it, at least – released, then we should be grateful.

    Longer term, we have to consider how to prevent a repetition of this sort of environmental disaster (and it could so easily have been a human disaster too). Vulnerable island states and coastlines need better protection and some need technical and organisational help. Coastal states need to be assessed on their competence and safety management in the same way as flag states. At least ship operators and owners would then know what they were letting themselves in for when entering a ‘black list’ state’s waters. Listing might just provide an incentive for the incompetent, the lazy and the venal among our maritime administrations to improve their standards – particularly if insurers penalise the poor performers. Generally, the bottom line proves more persuasive than political pressure.

    1. I was in contact with the Coast Guard from the moment of grounding. They did in fact relay a warning prior to impact but without response. Shortly after impact a Coast Guard team went to the ship but the crew had run away.

      A Dutch Salvor was appointed.

      For almost 3 weeks the ship was fine. Following a wind drive high tide it shifted and one of the bunkers cracked.
      I served on the National Crisis Committee.
      I and saw the inner workings of that committee.
      It was astonishing. All participants in the cleanup signed NDA agreements.
      Mauritius is also a registered international brand. So press releases are controlled by the brand managers.
      The government was newly elected and the opposition parties took this opportunity to attempt a coup. As a diving journalist I interviewed all the players.
      It was a brilliant effort of National cooperation.

  4. “The captain also had two glasses of whisky and water at the birthday party of a crewmember before the accident”

    This fact is not recorded in the Panama Flag State investigation report.

  5. Until the Govt of Mauritius hands over the ship’s VDR recording to the Flag State, we will never know the whole truth.

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